|
1
|
THE COST-SHARING OF EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOODS
Presenter: Antonio Nicolo', DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF PADUA
Session: Allocation Mechanisms
- Monday 27 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
2
|
MINORITY VS. MAJORITY. AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF STANDARDIZED BIDS
Presenter: Agnes Pinter, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Session: Voting and Experiments
- Monday 27 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: EEA
|
|
3
|
THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS
Presenter: Jo Thori Lind, University of Oslo
Session: Theory I
- Monday 27 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: EEA
|
|
4
|
TOP MONOTONICITY: A WEAKK DOMAIN RESTRICTION ECOMPASSING SINGLE PEAKEDNESS, SINGLE CROSSING AND ORDER RESTRICTION
Presenter: Salvador Barbera, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Session: Theory I
- Monday 27 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: EEA
|
|
5
|
INCENTIVES FOR INFORMATIVE VOTING
Presenter: Jean-Francois Laslier, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris
Session: Voting
- Wednesday 29 August 2007, 11:30:00 - 13:30:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
6
|
UNEMPLOYMENT AND GANG CRIME: COULD PROSPERITY BACKFIRE?
Presenter: Panu Poutvaara, University of Helsinki
Session: Crime
- Wednesday 29 August 2007, 11:30:00 - 13:30:00
Event/Category: EEA
|
|
7
|
COLLECTIVELY INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE TAX SYSTEMS
Presenter: Felix Bierbrauer, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Session: Taxation
- Wednesday 29 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
8
|
COALITION FORMATION IN POLITICAL GAMES
Presenter: Georgy Egorov, Harvard University
Session: Political Economy I
- Wednesday 29 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
9
|
CONSENSUS ON CONSENSUS IN HETEROGENEOUS GROUPS
Presenter: Daniel Cardona, Universitat de les Illes Balears
Session: Bargaining
- Thursday 30 August 2007, 09:00:00 - 11:00:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
10
|
GROUP FORMATION, FARSIGHTED AGENTS, AND SEARCH FRICTIONS
Presenter: Ethan Cohen-Cole, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Session: Groups Formation and Rent Seeking
- Thursday 30 August 2007, 09:00:00 - 11:00:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
11
|
DETECTING THE CULPRIT
Presenter: Shyh-fang Ueng, Department of Economics, National Chung-Cheng University
Session: Bargaining and Games
- Thursday 30 August 2007, 11:30:00 - 13:30:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
12
|
THE AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES: CAN WE IGNORE THE PAST?
Presenter: Stephane Zuber, Toulouse School of Economics
Session: Social Choice
- Thursday 30 August 2007, 11:30:00 - 13:30:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
13
|
ORDERING INFINITE UTILITY STREAMS : COMPLETENESS AT THE COST OF A NON-RAMSEY SET
Presenter: Luc Lauwers, KULeuven Belgium
Session: Social Choice
- Thursday 30 August 2007, 11:30:00 - 13:30:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
14
|
FREE TRIPLES, LARGE INDIFFERENCE CLASSES AND THE MAJORITY RULE
Presenter: Salvador Barbera, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Session: Social Choice
- Thursday 30 August 2007, 11:30:00 - 13:30:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
15
|
A GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POWER MEASURE
Presenter: Szilvia Pápai, concordia University
Session: Social Norms and Social Network II
- Thursday 30 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: ESEM: Theoretical and Applied Economics
|
|
16
|
OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION AND PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION IN A TWO-CLASS ECONOMY
Presenter: Felix Bierbrauer, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Session: Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision
- Thursday 30 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: EEA
|
|
17
|
HOUSE ALLOCATION WITH EXISTING TENANTS: A NEW SOLUTION
Presenter: Ozgur Yilmaz, Koc University
Session: Search, Matching and Sorting II
- Friday 31 August 2007, 15:00:00 - 17:00:00
Event/Category: EEA
|